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defendant knew or believed that the items 
he pawned were stolen. The substantive 
use of defendant's prior bad acts and felo-
nies added greatly to the likelihood that the 
jury inferred guilty knowledge from the 
character of defendant. Such use was 
highly prejudicial and under the circum-
stances of this case cannot be said to have 
been harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt" 
Defendant also raises several additional 
points on appeal. In light of our resolution 
of the above issues, we need not address 
those points. Defendant's conviction is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for a new 
trial. 
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; Brent H. Cameron, David R. 
Irvine and James M. Byrne, Commis-
sioners of the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah, and P.B.I. Freight Ser-
vice, Inc., Defendants. 
No. 19237. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1986. 
Carrier applied for common motor 
carrier authority to haul general commodi-
ties over irregular routes between points 
within particular intrastate area. The Pub-
lic Service Commission denied carrier's ap-
plication, and carrier petitioned for review. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: 
(1) carrier did not have to prove inadequacy 
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of existing service or future need for ex-
panded service as prerequisite to obtaining 
the authority sought; (2) denial of applica-
tion based on finding that service currently 
provided by another carrier was adequate 
was improper; and (3) application of carrier 
was not equivalent of transfer of authority 
from carrier's predecessor which had aban-
doned the same authority the carrier 
sought, such that carrier was relieved from 
justifying issuance of new authority, where 
predecessor's authority had been revoked. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Automobiles «=»78 
Carrier which applied for common mo-
tor carrier authority to haul general com-
modities over irregular routes in particular 
intrastate area did not have to prove inade-
quacy of existing service or future need for 
expanded service as prerequisite to obtain-
ing the authority sought. 
2. Automobiles ^»74 
Policy of law governing issuance of 
certificates of public convenience and ne-
cessity for motor common carriers is to 
foster competition, unless public conve-
nience and necessity dictates otherwise. 
U.C.A.1953, 54-6-5. 
3. Automobiles *=»78 
Adequacy of existing motor carrier 
service is only one factor which the Public 
Service Commission should consider in de-
termining whether issuance of additional 
intrastate motor carrier authority is con-
sistent with public convenience and necessi-
ty. 
4. Automobiles *=»78 
Although Public Service Commission 
should not allow motor common carrier to 
engage in predatory competition, beneficial 
effect of competition on service and rates 
should be recognized in determining wheth-
er public interest requires grant of new 
intrastate carrier authority, notwithstand-
ing adverse impact on existing carriers. 
21. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 LEd.2d 705 (1967). 
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5. Automobiles *»78 
Diversion of traffic or revenue from 
existing motor common carriers by addi-
tional competition is not a valid reason by 
itself to justify denial of additional intra-
state carrier authority. 
6. Automobiles S=»78 
Denial of motor common carrier's ap-
plication for authority to haul general com-
modities over irregular routes between 
points within particular intrastate area 
based on finding that existing authorized 
carrier's service was adequate was improp-
er. 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=>486 
Findings of administrative agency 
should be sufficiently detailed to disclose 
steps by which ultimate factual conclusions 
or conclusions of mixed fact and law are 
reached, to permit Supreme Court to per-
form its duty of reviewing agency's orders 
in accordance with established legal princi-
ples and protecting parties and public from 
arbitrary and capricious administrative ac-
tion. 
8. Automobiles $»78 
Ultimate standard which governs is-
suance of certificate of intrastate motor 
common carrier authority is whether the 
public convenience and necessity require 
granting of certificate. 
9. Automobiles «=>78 
Whatever would be detrimental to best 
interests of the people of the state is rele-
vant to issue of whether new intrastate 
motor common carrier authority comports 
with public convenience and necessity, in-
cluding the effect upon existing transporta-
tion facilities in territory proposed to be 
served and the traveling public. U.C.A. 
1953, 54-6-5. 
10. Automobiles *»78 
Even though economic welfare of ship-
pers and citizens generally in more remote 
parts of the state is a significant factor in 
determining whether to issue new intra-
state motor common carrier authority, Pub-
lic Service Commission cannot make ration-
al decision on where public interest lies 
with respect to request for authority with-
out making some effort to balance affirma-
tive effects of competition to shippers in 
the area in which shipping authority is re-
quested against impact on carrier currently 
in service and its ability to serve outlying 
service areas at reasonable rates and ex-
tent to which those rates might be affect-
ed, if at all. 
11. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>460 
Automobiles 4=>83 
Although applicant seeking intrastate 
motor common carrier authority in particu-
lar area generally has burden of proof in 
proceeding for new authority, protestant 
who urges adverse impact upon it as rea-
son for denying application has burden of 
proof on that point, which burden cannot 
be met simply by conclusory statements in 
oral testimony. 
12. Automobiles e=>83 
Application for motor common carrier 
authority to haul general commodities over 
irregular routes between points within par-
ticular intrastate area was not the equiva-
lent of a transfer of authority from one 
carrier to another such that carrier apply-
ing for authority was not required to prove 
that the transfer furthered public conve-
nience and necessity where carrier's prede-
cessor's authority had been revoked upon 
predecessor's abandonment of that authori-
ty, even though the carrier applied for that 
same authority the day following abandon-
ment of the authority. 
Frank S. Warner, Douglas J. Holmes, 
Ogden, for appellant. 
William S. Richards, David L. Wilkinson, 
Atty. Gen., James L. Barker, Jr., Div. of 
Public Service, Salt Lake City, for respon-
dent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 
contends on this petition for review that 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) erred 
MILNE TRUCK LINES v. 
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in denying it common carrier authority to 
haul general commodities over irregular 
routes between points within the Salt Lake-
Utah County area. 
The PSC denied Milne's application on 
the ground that (1) Milne failed to prove 
"either an inadequacy in the existing ser-
vice or potential market growth justifying 
new service" and (2) even if inadequacy of 
existing service were assumed, additional 
competition from Milne in the market area 
was not in the public interest because it 
might seriously weaken the protestant PBI 
Freight Service Inc. (PBI) and result in a 
loss of motor common carriage of general 
commodities to remote areas of Utah out-
side the Salt Lake-Utah County area. 
Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc., held the 
same intrastate authority as that sought by 
Milne until May 26, 1982, when Rio Grande 
abandoned its authority. The next day 
Milne was granted the same authority on a 
temporary basis. PBI, a motor common 
carrier which has general commodity au-
thority over irregular routes in the same 
area, protested Milne's application on the 
alleged ground that competition from Milne 
would put PBI out of business. PBI is the 
only other carrier that has such authority 
in that area. 
Milne contends that the Commission 
erred in four respects. It asserts that (1) 
the Commission applied an erroneous legal 
standard in requiring Milne to prove either 
inadequacy of existing service in the mar-
ket area or potential market growth which 
would justify new service; (2) the Commis-
sion's finding that competition between 
Milne and PBI would be detrimental to the 
best interests of the state was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence; (3) Milne is 
entitled to a certificate as a matter of law 
because of unrebutted evidence which es-
tablished a potential need for future ser-
vice in the market area; and (4) Milne's 
application should have been judged under 
the standards which govern the transfer of 
existing authority rather than those that 
govern the grant of new authority because 
Milne sought the same authority that Rio 
Grande Motor Way had abandoned. 
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I. THE FACTS 
The applicant, Milne Truck Lines, is a 
subsidiary of Sun Oil Company and has 
intrastate authority in Arizona, California, 
Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as 
interstate authority. The intrastate au-
thority sought by Milne in Salt Lake and 
Utah Counties was held by Rio Grande 
Motor Way from approximately 1970 until 
May 26, 1982. When Milne submitted its 
application to the Commission on May 27 
for the same authority as that abandoned 
by Rio Grande, it was granted temporary 
intrastate authority in the Salt Lake-Utah 
County area, pursuant to which it has 
served approximately 220 shippers in that 
area. Following the hearing on Milne's 
application for permanent authority, the 
PSC found that Milne had run a system-
wide deficit over the previous two years, 
but found it financially At and operational-
ly able to serve the area. 
PBI Freight Service, Inc., has intrastate 
common carrier authority in Utah, roughly 
from Salt Lake County south, including 
points in Utah, Grand, Kane, Millard, Sevi-
er, and San Juan counties. PBI also has 
interstate authority into Arizona, Califor-
nia, and Nevada. With the withdrawal of 
Rio Grande, PBI became the only perma-
nently authorized intrastate general com-
modity carrier between Salt Lake and Utah 
counties, although specialized carriers com-
pete in the market area to some extent 
PBI has, according to the Commission's 
findings, a reasonably sizeable net worth, 
but was experiencing a cash flow problem 
at the time of the hearing. For the period 
January 1 through October 1, 1982, D and 
H Investment Co., PBFs parent company, 
had gross revenue of $2,824,758, which in-
cluded operating revenue of $1,347,185, in-
terstate truckload revenue of $414,468, con-
tract revenue of $1,046,941, and other reve-
nue of $16,164. For the same period, it 
earned a net income of $22,660, of which 
approximately $8,000 was from operations. 
The Commission's finding that PBI suf-
fered an $80,000 deficit is simply in error. 
The Commission also found that PBI has 
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idle equipment and can "easily provide the 
proposed service at present levels or sub-
stantially increased levels." 
In denying Milne's application, the Com-
mission found that PBI's traffic into Utah 
County had been "steadily declining" over 
the preceding three years as a result of the 
"generally poor economy, federal deregula-
tion which had allowed an increase in the 
number of interstate carriers hauling into 
Utah County, and increased specialized 
carrier competition." The Commission also 
found that the traffic "over the past two to 
three years had been at best marginal for 
the support of two general commodity com-
mon carriers." 
The Commission ruled that since Milne 
was applying for the same authority that 
an existing carrier already had, Milne had 
the burden of proving either inadequacy of 
existing service or a future need for addi-
tional service and that Milne had failed to 
meet its burden. The Commission held 
that even if PBFs service were deficient, 
the public interest nevertheless required a 
denial of the application because of the 
potential impact of the loss of PBI service 
to areas outside the Salt Lake-Utah County 
market area. 
II. INADEQUACY OF SERVICE AS 
PREREQUISITE TO AUTHORIZA-
TION OF NEW AUTHORITY 
[1,2] The Commission erred in ruling 
that Milne had to prove an inadequacy of 
existing service or a future need for ex-
panded service as a prerequisite to obtain-
ing the authority sought. It is decidedly 
not the law that established motor common 
carriers should be protected by the Com-
mission from new competition as long as 
they provide a reasonably adequate service 
and can meet growing demands for com-
mon carrier service. Big K Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 
1984); Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 2 Utah 2d 23, 268 
P.2d 990 (1954). Utah law does not grant 
certificated common carriers a vested inter-
est in the market areas they serve; their 
certificates of authority do not confer the 
right to exclude competition simply to pro-
tect their own self-interest. On the con-
trary, it is the policy of the act to foster 
competition, unless the public convenience 
and necessity dictates otherwise, because 
competition in most cases stimulates better 
service and lower rates far more effective-
ly and efficiently than the Commission can 
by regulation. 
As this Court stated in Big K, supra: 
In determining whether the public in-
terest and necessity are served by addi-
tional service, the Commission must con-
sider numerous factors. It must weigh 
the benefits to be derived from increased 
competition, such as the potential benefi-
cial effect upon rates, customer service, 
the acquisition of equipment more suit-
able to customer needs, the efficient use 
of equipment, greater responsiveness in 
meeting future shipper needs, and great-
er efficiency in the use of route struc-
tures and interlining arrangements. In 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 103 Utah 459, 466, 
135 P.2d 915, 918 (1943), this Court stat-
ed that "regulated competition is as 
much within the provisions of [§ 54-6-5] 
as is regulated monopoly No one 
can have a vested right to be free from 
competition, to have a monopoly against 
the public." 
Id. at 1354. 
In Big K, supra, the Commission denied 
a carrier's application for route authority 
which competed with existing carriers be-
cause the applicant failed to prove an inad-
equacy of service by the existing carriers. 
This Court reversed on the ground that the 
Commission had erred in holding that an 
applicant's failure to prove "inadequacy of 
service" required denial of the application. 
The Court held that U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5, 
which governs the issuance of certificates 
of public convenience and necessity for mo-
tor common carriers, was not intended to 
protect the private interests of existing 
carriers in a given market, that "competi-
tion is almost always an affirmative factor 
in furthering the public convenience and 
necessity[,]" and that diversion of revenue 
MILNE TRUCK LINES v. 
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from existing carriers by additional compe-
tition "is not a valid reason by itself to 
justify a denial of additional authority." 
/<£ at 1365. The Court stated: 
The ultimate criterion against which all 
relevant factors are to be evaluated is 
the "public good and convenience," Salt 
Lake & Utah Railroad Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, 106 Utah 403, 408, 
149 P.2d 647, 649 (1944), not the existing 
carriers' convenience and necessity. See 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. 
Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 120, 339 P.2d 
1011, 1014-15 (1959).... [Competition 
is almost always an affirmative factor in 
furthering the public convenience and ne-
cessity. 
Id. 
[3,4] Proof of inadequate service may 
require the Commission to grant new au-
thority, but it does not follow that proof of 
adequate service requires a denial of new 
authority. The Commission's duty is to 
protect the public interest, not the en-
trenched rights of the industry it is 
charged with regulating. The adequacy of 
existing service is only one factor which 
the Commission should consider in deter-
mining whether the issuance of additional 
authority is consistent with the public con-
venience and necessity.1 The existence of 
adequate service in a market area does not 
mean that service could not be improved by 
competition. Although the Commission 
should not allow a carrier to engage in 
predatory competition, the beneficial effect 
of competition on service and rates, not-
withstanding an adverse impact on existing 
carriers, should be recognized in determin-
ing whether the public interest requires 
new authority. We agree with the princi-
ple stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
in Quinn Distributing Co. Inc. v. Quast 
1. Other courts have also held, consistent with 
our view in Big K, supra, that inadequacy of 
service is only one factor to be considered in 
determining the ultimate question of the public 
convenience and necessity. See, e.g., Black Ball 
Freight Service, Inc. v. Washington Utilities & 
Transportation Commission, 74 Wash.2d 871, 
875. 447 PJJd 597, 599 (1968); Hartwig v. Pugh, 
97 Idaho 236, 241, 542 ?2d 70, 75 (1975); Sa-
mardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C. 
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Transfer, Inc., 288 Minn. 442, 450, 181 
N.W.2d 696, 700 (1970), 
Even if Quinn's service had been al-
ways completely exemplary and even if 
Quinn were able to expand its services 
according to increasing demand, the com-
mission could still reasonably conclude 
that a grant to another carrier would be 
in the public convenience and necessity. 
[5] A corollary of the above principle is 
that a diversion of traffic or revenue from 
existing carriers by additional competition 
is not a valid reason by itself to justify a 
denial of additional authority. Big K, 689 
P.2d at 1355. That principle is widely rec-
ognized. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington in Black Ball Freight Service, Inc. 
v. Washington Utilities & Transportation 
Commission, 74 Wash.2d 871, 447 P.2d 597 
(1968), stated that "the courts have consist-
ently held that a possible loss in revenue is 
not a sufficient ground for denying an ap-
plication, when the need for more service 
has been shown." Id. at 876, 447 P.2d at 
600. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico stated in Garrett Freight 
Lines, Inc. v. State Corporation Commis-
sion, 63 N.M. 48, 312 P.2d 1061 (1957): "A 
decrease in revenue or sharing of existing 
tonnage will not in itself defeat an applica-
tion [by another motor carrier to furnish 
additional service]." Id. at 56, 312 P.2d at 
1066. See also State ex rel Churchill 
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 555 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1977); Bralley-Willett Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Holtzman Oil Corporation, 216 Va. 888, 
890, 223 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1976). If the law 
were otherwise, authorization of additional 
competition would never be justified. 
[6] In sum, we hold that the Commis-
sion erred in ruling that because Pitt's 
Corp., 183 Neb. 229. 236. 159 N.W.2d 310. 315-
16 (1968); Bralley-Willett Tank Lines, inc. v. 
Holtzman Oil Corp., 216 Va. 888. 890, 223 S.E2d 
892, 893-94 (1976); United Van Lines, inc. v. 
United States, 266 FSupp. 586, 589 (E.D.Mo. 
1967); Texas Mexican Railway Co. v. United 
States, 250 F.Supp. 946. 950 (S.D.Tex. 1966); 
Campus Travel Inc. v. United States, 224 
F.Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y.1963). 
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service was adequate Milne's application 
should be denied.1 
III. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
17] The Commission cannot discharge 
its statutory responsibilities without mak-
ing findings of fact on all necessary ulti-
mate issues under the governing statutory 
standards. It is also essential that the 
Commission make subsidiary findings in 
sufficient detail that the critical subor-
dinate factual issues are highlighted and 
resolved in such a fashion as to demon-
strate that there is a logical and legal basis 
for the ultimate conclusions. The impor-
tance of complete, accurate, and consistent 
findings of fact is essential to a proper 
determination by an administrative agency. 
-To that end, findings should be sufficiently 
detailed to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, are reached. See 
generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such find-
ings, this Court cannot perform its duty of 
reviewing the Commission's order in ac-
cordance with established legal principles 
and of protecting the parties and the public 
from arbitrary and capricious administra-
tive action. In Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Utah Public Service Com-
mission, 636 P.2d 1047, 1058 (Utah 1981), 
we stated in a somewhat different context: 
In administrative matters such as this, 
there must be findings on all material 
issues. Colorado Wyoming Gas Co. v. 
Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 
626, 65 S.Ct. 850, 89 L.Ed. 1235 (1945); 
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Wy-
oming Oil and Gas Conservation Com-
mission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550 (1968). 
Only then can the interests of the public, 
the ratepayers, and the utility be protect-
ed. Furthermore, it is not possible for 
2. Milne contends that the PSC erred in finding 
that PBI's service was adequate. Clearly the 
evidence was conflicting; indeed, the PSC ex-
pressly acknowledged that there was at least 
some degree of shipper antagonism toward, and 
discontent with, PBI. However, the Commis-
sion's finding is not so devoid of substantial 
this Court, without such a foundation, to 
perform its assigned task of judicial *e? 
view. Application of Hawaii Electric 
Light Co., Inc., Hawaii, 594 P.2d 612 
(1979); American Can Co. v. Davis, 28 
Or.App. 207, 559 P.2d 898 (1977). 
[8,9] The ultimate standard which gov-
erns the issuance of a certificate of authori-
ty is whether "the public convenience and 
necessity require" the granting of a certifi-
cate. Whatever would be detrimental to 
the "best interests of the people of the 
state of Utah" is relevant to the issue of 
whether new authority comports with the 
public convenience and necessity, including 
the effect upon "the existing transporta-
tion facilities in the territory proposed to be 
served, and the travelling public." § 54-6-
5. The public convenience and necessity 
contemplates "the most efficient and eco-
nomical service possible" to the public un-
der the circumstances. PBI Freight Ser-
vice v. Public Service Commission, 598 
P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1979). 
In ruling against Milne, the Commission 
focused on two concerns. First, it purport-
ed to address the financial condition of PBI 
and the economic conditions of the market 
area in question; however, its findings 
were inadequate. The Commission found 
that for the past two or three years, the 
Salt Lake-Utah County market area "ha3 
been at best marginal for the support of 
two general commodity carriers," but ft 
made no subordinate findings of fact that 
supported that conclusion. Indeed, Rio 
Grande's operations appear to have been 
profitable in that market area prior to'its 
termination of operations. The Commis-
sion's findings do not indicate what PBI's 
experience had been in that particular area, 
although there is some evidence that it, too, 
was profitable. Beyond that, the evidence 
indicates that the Richfield market area 
was highly profitable for PBI. The Corn-
supporting evidence that it can be set aside. 
Harry L Young & Sons, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 672 P.2d 728. 729 (Utah 1983); 
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission. 658 P.2d 601, 609 
(Utah 1983). 
MILNE TRUCK LINES v. 
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mission's findings that PBFs traffic into 
Utah County had declined does not neces-
sarily mean that PBI was losing money on 
that part of its operations. Furthermore, 
the Commission made no finding as to 
whether the decline in traffic in the Salt 
Lake-Utah County market was due to a 
temporary slowing of the economy or to 
circumstances which might be long-term. 
Milne, however, adduced evidence that the 
population in the two counties was increas-
ing rapidly and sought to infer from that 
fact the conclusion that the demand for 
transportation services would increase. 
The Commission did not address that point 
either. Beyond the inadequacy of the find-
ings, the Commission confused a temporary 
cash flow deficit, which PBI experienced, 
with a deficit from operations which PBI 
had not experienced, according to its latest 
financial statement. 
Second, the Commission stated its con-
cern that the failure of PBI "with concomi-
tant loss of its service to remote localities 
would be a detriment to the residents of 
those areas." * Although that is a relevant 
concern in assessing the public convenience 
and necessity, it was not supported by ade-
quate subsidiary findings of fact. The 
Commission did not find that issuance of 
the authority would put PBI out of busi-
ness or even impair its service to those 
areas. Indeed, there is no evidence of 
which we are aware that would support 
such a conclusion, although the Commis-
sion did find that competition in the Salt 
Lake-Utah County market area would 
"substantially increase the overhead costs 
which would have to be allocated to other 
routes extending beyond Utah County 
which protestant serves " 
[10] Even though the economic welfare 
of shippers and of the citizens generally in 
the more remote parts of Utah is a signifi-
cant factor, the Commission cannot make a 
rational decision on where the public inter-
3. The Commission, however, made no finding 
that PBI would go out of business if Milne's 
application were approved. In its conclusions 
of law, the Commission referred only to the 
"potential impact on areas outside the immedi-
ate proposed service area," but the Commis-
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est lies in this matter without making some 
effort to balance the affirmative effects of 
competition to shippers in the Salt Lake 
Utah County area against the impact on 
PBI and its ability to serve the outlying 
PBI service areas at reasonable rates and 
the extent to which those rates might be 
affected, if at all. The issue has particular 
significance in the instant case because 
PBI now has a monopoly with respect to 
unrestricted common carrier authority in 
the most populous area in the state. Of 
course that monopoly is not an absolute 
economic monopoly; there are limited 
forms of competition from private carriers, 
specialized common carriers, and, to some 
degree, from interstate carriers. Never-
theless, the number of shippers and the 
volume of freight that PBI is alone autho-
rized to serve are no doubt significant. 
[11] Finally, the Commission made no 
finding at all showing the relative impor-
tance of the Utah County traffic to the 
total PBI operation, apparently because 
there was no evidence on the point. Such 
an analysis would seem essential to placing 
the other findings in a context in which it is 
possible to judge their importance. In this 
regard, we note that although an applicant 
generally has the burden of proof in a 
proceeding for new authority, a protestant 
who urges an adverse impact on it as a 
reason for denying the application, has the 
burden of proof on that point. That bur-
den cannot be met simply by conclusory 
statements in oral testimony. 
Since the Commission applied an incor-
rect standard in determining the effect to 
be given competition in assessing the public 
convenience and necessity, it is necessary 
to remand to the Commission to reconsider 
this case in light of the appropriate stan-
dard. It is, of course, the prerogative of 
the Commission to decide the ultimate is-
sue, but it will also be necessary for the 
sion's report also refers to a shifting of some of 
PBI's overhead costs to the service performed in 
that area if additional authority were granted, 
thereby assuming that PBI would not be put out 
of business by additional competition. 
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Commission to make additional findings of 
fact that resolve issues which are relevant 
to the legal standards that will govern the 
Commission's decision. Some of those is-
sues have been outlined above. 
IV. TRANSFERABILITY OF RIO 
GRANDE'S AUTHORITY 
[12] Milne contends that its application 
for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity was in effect a request for a 
transfer of Rio Grande's certificate, which 
relieved Milne of having to justify the is-
suance of new authority. See Collett v. 
Public Service Commission, 116 Utah 413, 
416, 211 P.2d 185, 187 (1949), which held 
that the transfer of authority from one 
carrier to another did not require the trans-
feree to prove that the transfer furthers 
the public convenience and necessity. But 
that rule does not apply when the putative 
transferor's authority has been revoked by 
the Commission. Since Rio Grande's au-
thority was revoked, the instant case is not 
the equivalent of a transfer of authority. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
• . 
Louis A. BANKS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 19974. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson and Peter F. Leary, JJ., of po* 
session of controlled substance and posset 
sion of dangerous weapon by restricted 
person and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Zimmerman, J., held that (1) search 
which discovered narcotics vial in defend-
ant's shirt pocket was validly conducted 
incident to arrest; (2) finding that defend-
ant possessed firearm discovered tinder 
bedroom pillow was not sufficiently sup-
ported by evidence; and (3) defendant was 
not denied right to speedy trial by 18-
month delay in rendering decision. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
1. Criminal Law <$=>394.4(13) 
Drug vial found in defendant's pocket 
was admissible where search was conduct-
ed incident to arrest, though officers' 
search warrant authorized only search of 
residence. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Drugs and Narcotics «=>189 
Officers were entitled to handcuff nar-
cotics suspect while executing search war-
rant on his residence in order to insure 
their safety, to prevent suspect from se-
creting contraband and to preserve premis-
es during search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
4. 
3. Searches and Seizures 4=>141 
Search warrant for residence or prem-
ises, properly issued upon probable cause, 
carries with it limited authority to detain 
occupant during search. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
4. Arrest *=*3.4(15) 
Even if officers' conduct in handcuff-
ing narcotics suspect while executing 
search warrant of his residence amounted 
to arrest, officers had probable cause to 
arrest narcotics suspect based upon con-
trolled buys which had been conducted pri-
or to search. 
5. Arrest «=»71.1<8) 
Search of narcotics suspect was not 
invalid, despite fact it preceded formal ar-
rest, where as arrest and search were sub-
